/**
 * @name Expression injection in Actions
 * @description Using user-controlled GitHub Actions contexts like `run:` or `script:` may allow a malicious
 *              user to inject code into the GitHub action.
 * @kind problem
 * @problem.severity warning
 * @security-severity 9.3
 * @precision high
 * @id js/actions/command-injection
 * @tags actions
 *       security
 *       external/cwe/cwe-094
 */

import javascript
import semmle.javascript.Actions

bindingset[context]
private predicate isExternalUserControlledIssue(string context) {
  context.regexpMatch("\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*issue\\s*\\.\\s*title\\b") or
  context.regexpMatch("\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*issue\\s*\\.\\s*body\\b")
}

bindingset[context]
private predicate isExternalUserControlledPullRequest(string context) {
  exists(string reg |
    reg =
      [
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*pull_request\\s*\\.\\s*title\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*pull_request\\s*\\.\\s*body\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*pull_request\\s*\\.\\s*head\\s*\\.\\s*label\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*pull_request\\s*\\.\\s*head\\s*\\.\\s*repo\\s*\\.\\s*default_branch\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*pull_request\\s*\\.\\s*head\\s*\\.\\s*repo\\s*\\.\\s*description\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*pull_request\\s*\\.\\s*head\\s*\\.\\s*repo\\s*\\.\\s*homepage\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*pull_request\\s*\\.\\s*head\\s*\\.\\s*ref\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*head_ref\\b"
      ]
  |
    context.regexpMatch(reg)
  )
}

bindingset[context]
private predicate isExternalUserControlledReview(string context) {
  context.regexpMatch("\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*review\\s*\\.\\s*body\\b")
}

bindingset[context]
private predicate isExternalUserControlledComment(string context) {
  context.regexpMatch("\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*comment\\s*\\.\\s*body\\b")
}

bindingset[context]
private predicate isExternalUserControlledGollum(string context) {
  context
      .regexpMatch("\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*pages\\[[0-9]+\\]\\s*\\.\\s*page_name\\b") or
  context.regexpMatch("\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*pages\\[[0-9]+\\]\\s*\\.\\s*title\\b")
}

bindingset[context]
private predicate isExternalUserControlledCommit(string context) {
  exists(string reg |
    reg =
      [
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*commits\\[[0-9]+\\]\\s*\\.\\s*message\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*head_commit\\s*\\.\\s*message\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*head_commit\\s*\\.\\s*author\\s*\\.\\s*email\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*head_commit\\s*\\.\\s*author\\s*\\.\\s*name\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*head_commit\\s*\\.\\s*committer\\s*\\.\\s*email\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*head_commit\\s*\\.\\s*committer\\s*\\.\\s*name\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*commits\\[[0-9]+\\]\\s*\\.\\s*author\\s*\\.\\s*email\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*commits\\[[0-9]+\\]\\s*\\.\\s*author\\s*\\.\\s*name\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*commits\\[[0-9]+\\]\\s*\\.\\s*committer\\s*\\.\\s*email\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*commits\\[[0-9]+\\]\\s*\\.\\s*committer\\s*\\.\\s*name\\b",
      ]
  |
    context.regexpMatch(reg)
  )
}

bindingset[context]
private predicate isExternalUserControlledDiscussion(string context) {
  context.regexpMatch("\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*discussion\\s*\\.\\s*title\\b") or
  context.regexpMatch("\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*discussion\\s*\\.\\s*body\\b")
}

bindingset[context]
private predicate isExternalUserControlledWorkflowRun(string context) {
  exists(string reg |
    reg =
      [
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*workflow_run\\s*\\.\\s*head_branch\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*workflow_run\\s*\\.\\s*display_title\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*workflow_run\\s*\\.\\s*head_repository\\b\\s*\\.\\s*description\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*workflow_run\\s*\\.\\s*head_commit\\b\\s*\\.\\s*message\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*workflow_run\\s*\\.\\s*head_commit\\b\\s*\\.\\s*author\\b\\s*\\.\\s*email\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*workflow_run\\s*\\.\\s*head_commit\\b\\s*\\.\\s*author\\b\\s*\\.\\s*name\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*workflow_run\\s*\\.\\s*head_commit\\b\\s*\\.\\s*committer\\b\\s*\\.\\s*email\\b",
        "\\bgithub\\s*\\.\\s*event\\s*\\.\\s*workflow_run\\s*\\.\\s*head_commit\\b\\s*\\.\\s*committer\\b\\s*\\.\\s*name\\b",
      ]
  |
    context.regexpMatch(reg)
  )
}

/**
 * Holds if environment name in the `injection` (in a form of `env.name`)
 * is tainted by the `context` (in a form of `github.event.xxx.xxx`).
 */
bindingset[injection]
predicate isEnvInterpolationTainted(string injection, string context) {
  exists(Actions::Env env, string envName, YamlString envValue |
    envValue = env.lookup(envName) and
    Actions::getEnvName(injection) = envName and
    Actions::getASimpleReferenceExpression(envValue) = context
  )
}

/**
 * Holds if the `run` contains any expression interpolation `${{ e }}`.
 * Sets `context` to the initial untrusted value assignment in case of `${{ env... }}` interpolation
 */
predicate isRunInjectable(Actions::Run run, string injection, string context) {
  Actions::getASimpleReferenceExpression(run) = injection and
  (
    injection = context
    or
    isEnvInterpolationTainted(injection, context)
  )
}

/**
 * Holds if the `actions/github-script` contains any expression interpolation `${{ e }}`.
 * Sets `context` to the initial untrusted value assignment in case of `${{ env... }}` interpolation
 */
predicate isScriptInjectable(Actions::Script script, string injection, string context) {
  exists(Actions::Step step, Actions::Uses uses |
    script.getWith().getStep() = step and
    uses.getStep() = step and
    uses.getGitHubRepository() = "actions/github-script" and
    Actions::getASimpleReferenceExpression(script) = injection and
    (
      injection = context
      or
      isEnvInterpolationTainted(injection, context)
    )
  )
}

from YamlNode node, string injection, string context
where
  exists(Actions::Using u, Actions::Runs runs |
    u.getValue() = "composite" and
    u.getRuns() = runs and
    (
      exists(Actions::Run run |
        isRunInjectable(run, injection, context) and
        node = run and
        run.getStep().getRuns() = runs
      )
      or
      exists(Actions::Script script |
        node = script and
        script.getWith().getStep().getRuns() = runs and
        isScriptInjectable(script, injection, context)
      )
    ) and
    (
      isExternalUserControlledIssue(context) or
      isExternalUserControlledPullRequest(context) or
      isExternalUserControlledReview(context) or
      isExternalUserControlledComment(context) or
      isExternalUserControlledGollum(context) or
      isExternalUserControlledCommit(context) or
      isExternalUserControlledDiscussion(context) or
      isExternalUserControlledWorkflowRun(context)
    )
  )
  or
  exists(Actions::On on |
    (
      exists(Actions::Run run |
        isRunInjectable(run, injection, context) and
        node = run and
        run.getStep().getJob().getWorkflow().getOn() = on
      )
      or
      exists(Actions::Script script |
        node = script and
        script.getWith().getStep().getJob().getWorkflow().getOn() = on and
        isScriptInjectable(script, injection, context)
      )
    ) and
    (
      exists(on.getNode("issues")) and
      isExternalUserControlledIssue(context)
      or
      exists(on.getNode("pull_request_target")) and
      isExternalUserControlledPullRequest(context)
      or
      exists(on.getNode("pull_request_review")) and
      (isExternalUserControlledReview(context) or isExternalUserControlledPullRequest(context))
      or
      exists(on.getNode("pull_request_review_comment")) and
      (isExternalUserControlledComment(context) or isExternalUserControlledPullRequest(context))
      or
      exists(on.getNode("issue_comment")) and
      (isExternalUserControlledComment(context) or isExternalUserControlledIssue(context))
      or
      exists(on.getNode("gollum")) and
      isExternalUserControlledGollum(context)
      or
      exists(on.getNode("push")) and
      isExternalUserControlledCommit(context)
      or
      exists(on.getNode("discussion")) and
      isExternalUserControlledDiscussion(context)
      or
      exists(on.getNode("discussion_comment")) and
      (isExternalUserControlledDiscussion(context) or isExternalUserControlledComment(context))
      or
      exists(on.getNode("workflow_run")) and
      isExternalUserControlledWorkflowRun(context)
    )
  )
select node,
  "Potential injection from the ${ " + injection +
    " }, which may be controlled by an external user."